Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Photo courtesy of Department of Defense/Todd P. Cichonowizc
Forces and the silos that housed them were destroyed. As Carter recounted:
[ How had it become possible to transform a missile field into a sunflower field within the lifetime of those who had grown up during the height of the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at each other tens of thousands of nuclear warheads deployed on submarines, ICBMs, strategic bombers, tactical aircraft, and numerous battlefield delivery systems? The unmatched destructive power of these weapons required that rigorous safety and security measures control their design parameters, production methods, transport, storage, and use. But as the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, deteriorating political and socioeconomic conditions gave rise to concerns over the future security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. What measures were in place to prevent the misuse or diversion of Soviet nuclear weapons, their design information, and related materials or technology?
Anticipating the possibility of loosely controlled nuclear weapons inside the former Soviet Union, key leaders in Congress and experts in the policy and academic communities began to assess the nature of this threat and to consider approaches to reducing the danger it posed to U.S. and global security. Out of these investigations emerged the initial Nunn-Lugar legislation and the broader Cooperative Threat Reduction program-an unprecedented effort to reduce nuclear dangers by securing or eliminating Russian weapons systems and related materials and capabilities using aid from the U.S. Government.
How did Nunn-Lugar come to be? Who were the key leaders, facilitators, and practitioners who recognized the need and opportunity-at a pivotal moment in history-to pioneer a program of cooperative security between two former adversaries? What key insights and lessons can be drawn from the origins of Nunn-Lugar? To answer these questions, this case study recounts initial attempts to aid the former Soviet Union, describes the events leading to the passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation, and reviews early efforts by the Senators to facilitate implementation of the program.
Sam Nunn: Longstanding Concerns about Nuclear Security and Risk Reduction
The creation and passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation occurred quickly over a period of weeks after the Cold War ended, but the concerns about managing nuclear risks that animated Sam Nunn extended back two decades. His discovery in the early 1970s of serious deficiencies in the security of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe was a formative experience that left him "thoroughly shaken" and committed to critically examining the safeguards that had-and had not-been in place to reduce the risks attending the deployment by both sides of many thousands of nuclear weapons and the way in which the superpowers practiced nuclear deterrence. 3 Later that decade, Nunn's concerns about the risks of nuclear war beginning accidentally led him to question U.S. nuclear planners about their ability-and that of Soviet planners as well-to determine with high confidence the origin of a ballistic missile strike directed at ei- 
Nunn-Aspin: The First Attempt to Aid the Soviet Union
These dangers demanded action if the risks of instability and "loose nukes" were to be managed effectively. But there was also opportunity embedded in these dangers. As Nunn and
Lugar later put it, U.S. policy grew "out of the realization that history had offered an unusual opportunity: the ability to enhance U.S. security with the cooperation and goodwill of the most lethal former adversary of the United States and at the same time enhance the security of the world's newest democracy and assist it with badly needed political, economic, and military re- 
The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction
Nunn, however, shared Aspin's sense of urgency and saw an opportunity to join forces to advance both their initiatives in Congress. As both the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees had proceeded to conference to reconcile their respective FY92 defense authorization bills, Nunn and Aspin agreed to combine their proposals into a single new initiative. This amendment would authorize the expenditure of defense funds to provide Moscow with humanitarian aid; technical assistance to safely transport, store, and dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons; and assistance in defense conversion, environmental cleanup of defense sites, and training and housing for decommissioned officers of the Strategic Rocket Forces. 15 Nunn, Aspin, and those supporting their amendment referred to it as an "anti-chaos" initiative or an "insurance policy" that constituted "defense by other means. " Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) argued that it presented "a chance to bury the new Hitlers and Stalins of that region before they have a chance to take root. " 16 Despite adamant opposition from House and Senate
Republicans, particularly over its provisions related to training and housing decommissioned Soviet officers, the Nunn-Aspin amendment was approved by the two defense authorization panels and added to the FY92 defense authorization bill-but only after straight party-line votes in both committees. 17 The White House was not enthusiastic about the amendment but chose to not openly oppose it as long as it did not mandate assistance to the Soviet Union-that is, as long as the authority to expend the funds was discretionary. Still, they had succeeded in raising awareness of the nuclear security issue, and important advocates emerged for the need to consider a more systematic and robust approach to the matter of assistance to the Soviet Union. 21 But a new approach to developing a legislative consensus was needed.
Toward Nunn-Lugar
A new approach began to take shape almost immediately after the demise of Nunn-Aspin. The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction do not end with the non-strategic and strategic deployments alone but extend to fissionable materials, components, delivery systems, and command and control systems. " 25 The point was clear:
the nuclear security and proliferation risks emanating from the disintegrating Soviet state were multidimensional and complex. "Loose nukes" had become the shorthand for this challenge, but far more than the weapons themselves was at issue.
The study examined specific threats that could result from deficiencies in Soviet nuclear safeguards and controls and suggested a range of measures to improve these controls and thus ensure safe custody of Soviet (and post-Soviet) nuclear weapons during a period of political transition. These measures ranged from inventory and data exchange to weapons dismantlement, disposal of special nuclear materials, and even contingency plans for the recapture of stolen weapons. 26 The authors believed that U.S. assistance could be instrumental in implementing many of their recommendations.
Additionally, the Harvard study documented the lack of nuclear capacity in the Soviet republics that were to become newly independent states and inheritors of Soviet nuclear weapons.
The authors noted that "of the republics of the Soviet Union, only Russia has within its borders anything like the technical means necessary for full-cycle operations and maintenance of a nuclear arsenal to world standards. " 27 The United States, they argued, had a significant stake in ensuring that the political settlement attending the dissolution of the Soviet Union not result in several new nuclear weapons states in the region. Not only would such states lack the knowledge or capability to exercise responsible control, but their possession of nuclear weapons could well be a destabilizing factor in the Eurasian region.
The impact of the November 19 meeting was instantaneous. Nunn and Lugar were reinforced in their commitment to revive the key elements of the Nunn-Aspin amendment, and the work to draft the new legislation began that day. 28 Nunn and Lugar convened a followup breakfast meeting 2 days later that included a bipartisan group of 16 senators. Carter repeated his briefing of the Harvard study. Recalling the opposition that had doomed Nunn-Aspin, the two Senators later remarked, "Once acquainted with Carter's analysis, these colleagues agreed that U.S. domestic political hostility to Soviet aid paled in comparison to the dangers in question. "
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In the discussion that took place that morning, Nunn and Lugar gathered the support of the senators in attendance for a $500 million proposal to provide assistance for the safe transport, storage, destruction, and nonproliferation of Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD). resented the most dramatic reversal of opinion they had ever experienced in the Senate. 32 On
November 27, the House of Representatives adopted the measure by acclamation. President
Bush signed it into law on December 12, 1991, 4 days after the first formal steps were taken to dissolve the Soviet Union. Certifying such compliance would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the post-Soviet states that were just forming. Discussions at the staff level yielded a compromise that required recipients to be "committed to" comply with the six conditions. This compromise cleared the way for passage of the legislation.
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Following Through in 1992
Having achieved the unlikely feat, over the course of just a few months, of directing several hundred million dollars to help a nation that for decades had been the mortal enemy of the 9
The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction
United States, Senators Nunn and Lugar and those who had helped them understood that their work had just begun. To be sure, it was now the job of the executive branch to craft specific policies and programs to implement the intent of the legislation. And the Bush administration had begun to mobilize to initiate implementation of Nunn-Lugar: a number of high-level visits to the region had yielded a range of proposals for specific programmatic activity; a senior level coordinator and negotiator had been named; and allies had been approached about a coordinated effort to assist the Soviet successor states. Still, by March 1992, the Senators were concerned that there had been insufficient progress in developing a concrete plan to use the Nunn-Lugar funds, despite calls from the leaders of Russia and other former Soviet republics to begin the process of destroying WMD and converting defense enterprises. 38 Moreover, they believed, as did a number of their Senate colleagues, that it was important to monitor carefully the post-Soviet political situation and the progress of the Newly Independent States (NIS).
In March 1992, Nunn and Lugar led the first of two Congressional delegations (CODEL)
to the NIS that were important in helping to establish assistance priorities, accelerate the provision of aid, and expand the scope of the Nunn-Lugar program. The report of the March CODEL urged that Nunn-Lugar funds be used for a number of specific purposes that would enable progress in WMD dismantlement. It was important, the report noted, to avoid focusing exclusively on nuclear dismantlement in Russia; as urgent as this task was, it was also critical to work with other NIS governments and not lose focus on the requirements of chemical weapons dismantlement. The report also recommended a number of steps to accelerate the process of defense conversion. Equally if not more important, the report highlighted what for Nunn and
Lugar was a principal conclusion of their visit: the need for a comprehensive U.S. strategy for helping the NIS that encompassed not just WMD dismantlement, but also economic development, especially steps to remove Cold War restrictions on commerce and encourage private sector investment. 39 The recommendations in the CODEL report became one of the foundations of the assis- The November CODEL report reiterated the March report's call for more active government involvement to encourage private sector investment in the NIS. This was an urgent priority for national security reasons but also one that would pay economic dividends later.
The CODEL was equally concerned by what it found with respect to nuclear security. As
Nunn and Lugar later observed: The fact was that one nuclear state had been replaced by four-each, in the Senators' words, with "severe internal economic, political, and ethnic strains. " Fortunately, the "nuclear inheritor" nations-Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine-reaffirmed to the CODEL their strong desire to remove nuclear weapons from their territory. However, they lacked the means, expertise, and resources to accomplish this. The CODEL report emphasized the importance of the prompt, safe dismantlement of strategic nuclear weapons, the ratification of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty by all parties (after which the dismantlement process could be accelerated), and the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states.
The danger that worsening economic conditions and persistent WMD security problems could feed on one another and produce a catastrophic outcome led Nunn and Lugar to conclude that the United States needed to focus greater attention to developing and executing the integrated national strategy for the NIS they had first called for after their March visit to the region.
This blueprint for relations with the post-Soviet nations should be organized, they argued, under a single senior level coordinator reporting directly to the President and secretary of state. Union and coordinating Nunn-Lugar activities. 46 And as the need for a more systematic, longer term effort became increasingly clear, cooperative threat reduction was granted its own line in the Defense budget for FY94. With a dedicated budget, funds no longer needed to be reprogrammed from other activities, and resource planning could become more predictable. The program was on solid footing.
Epilogue: Lugar Looks Back and Ahead
Speaking to his colleagues in the U.S. Senate on December 18, 2009, Richard Lugar reflected on the origins of the legislation that bears his name, the accomplishments of nearly two decades of cooperative threat reduction, and the challenges of the future. 47 He noted that as of 
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At the end of the Cold War, the Nunn-Lugar program provided the means to defuse a potentially serious threat, begin the process of reorienting U.S.-Russian relations toward greater cooperation, and enable the peaceful transition of the former Soviet republics.
